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BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH ARBITRATION *
CHARLES L. NORDON I
No practical disquisition on this subject should neglect its psychological
aspect. First of all, an observer is moved to enquire why the solution of
justiciable disputes by Arbitration procedure is in many cases preferred to
litigation in a country like England, whose judicial system and the probity,
wisdom and incorruptibility of whose judiciary are alike the pride of its
citizens and the admiration of its observers.
The growth of Arbitration is an obvious reflection upon the judicial
courts of the country. If the latter provide all the citizen wants, the Arbitra-
tor is not necessary. It should be noted at the outset, however, that an
Arbitration does not connote quite the same degree of forensic hostility as a
lawsuit and that the Englishman is imbued from youth upwards with the
"spirit of the umpire" and obedience to the Referee's decision to an extent
which perhaps is unknown in most other countries. Furthermore, he prefers
a quick decision, even though adverse, to a favourable one coming too late
to be of real service or to obviate the anxieties and delays of the waiting
period. The writer will attempt in this paper to present the fruits of his
experience in Arbitration and such of the advantages and many of the diffi-
culties which that experience has brought to light.
To fill in the background of this experience and to answer this psycho-
logical query, it may be useful to differentiate the various types of cases in
which resort is had to arbitration.
Strictly speaking, we should exclude those cases where the parties in
framing a contract agree that price, quantity or quality, not defined with
adequate certainty in the contract itself, is left to be fixed by Arbitration.
From a precise juridical standpoint, that fixation is not Arbitration at all.
It is merely an expression of the parties' intention to apply the rule id certum
est, quod certum reddi potest, in order that their contract shall not be void for
uncertainty. As soon as the quasi-Arbitrator, or valuer or expert, as he
should more properly be called, has certified the price, quantity or quality,
as the case may be, the parties are ad idem. In other words, the Arbitra-
tor does not decide the rights of the parties to the contract, he merely forges
the contractual nexus.
* It was planned to publish this article in the symposium on commercial arbitration
presented in the December issue of this REVIEw, but unavoidable circumstances have delayed
its publication until the present number.
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There is next to be considered the submission to arbitration of any
future disputes as to quality or value in a contract already definite in its
terms.1 There the parties prefer to be bound by the decision of the expert
applying his own accredited technical knowledge rather than by that of the
nontechnical tribunal which hears and decides on the evidence of experts
as witnesses. Of such Arbitrations the public hears but little. They seldom
involve questions of law, and the Arbitrator decides upon the basis of his
own inspection or technical test. In England such Arbitrations are by far
the largest in number. Most trade associations have their "panels" of Arbi-
trators, who for a fee of a few guineas are ready to express their opinion
on the physical subject matter of the dispute, often without hearing or at
most after reading statements of the adversaries' conflicting contentions.
Then there are the submission clauses in contracts to provide for future
Arbitrations before any dispute has arisen, the parties by their contract seek-
ing to avoid court litigation. Submissions of this kind may be sub-divided
into:-
(a) Where the parties agree, in a contract drafted ad hoc and of
their own free choice, that possible disputes thereunder shall be arbi-
trated, and
(b) Where the person who wishes to do business with a particular
company or firm is obliged, whether he likes it or not, to accept the
latter's printed form of contract containing an Arbitration clause pro-
tecting its author from the jurisdiction of the courts.
Finally, there is the agreement, simpliciter, to submit to Arbitration,
without any precedent obligation, a dispute which has already arisen, but
which the parties are under no legal compulsion to arbitrate.
British practice in dealing with these situations has been largely gov-
erned by statute. The modern Arbitration tribunal is the creation of the
Arbitration Act, 1889,2 which has served a useful public need during its 45
years of currency and has only this year been amended by the Act of 1934.3
It is interesting to observe that Arbitration is now upon an international
basis. Effect was given by the Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act, I924,'
to the League of Nations Protocol 5 providing for the international recog-
nition of the validity of submissions to arbitration made between the parties
who are subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting states. For this
reason it is very important that in submissions to Arbitration by parties of
I. Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. C. 8i (1856) ; cf. In re Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E.
248 (924), (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 98.
2. 52 & 53 VIcr., c. 49 (889).
3. 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 14 (1934).
4. 14 & 15 Gwo. V, c. 39 (1924).
5. Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL (Supp.
r923) 342
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different nationality, the country where the Arbitration is to be held and
whose law is to govern the dispute should be specified. Otherwise the Arbi-
tration would be held in the country where performance is due, and its lex
loci would be applied.
In spite of certain difficulties in procedure which arise from time to
time, Arbitration in England seems in practice to work reasonably well.
Notwithstanding the enormous number of Arbitrations in the course of the
year, there are relatively few which proceed for review.in the Courts, though
perhaps this may be attributable to the consequential expense. Rapidity is
of course the chief allurement of the Arbitration Chamber and this aspect
is now reinforced by Section 6 of the 1934 Act 6 which gives the Court power
to remove a dilatory Arbitrator.
7
After 45 years experience with the Act of 1889, Parliament has not
thought fit to make any very drastic alterations in it. by the 1934 Act 8 of
which the principal provisions deal with:-
(i) Death or bankruptcy of parties to submission.
(2) Increased powers of court in the matter of appointments of
Arbitrator and Umpire.
(3) Power to remove a dilatory Arbitrator.
(4) Power to order specific performance of a contract; security
for costs; discovery of documents; affidavit evidence; examination of
witnesses on commission in a foreign country; the detention, preserva-
tion or inspection of the property the subject of the reference; inteirim
injunctions and the appointment of a receiver.
(5) Limitation on the right of appeal from the decision of the
court on cases stated by the Arbitrator.
(6) Power to enter judgment in terms of the award.
(7) Power to assess or tax the Arbitrator's remuneration.
(8) Further relief against partiality or misconduct of the Arbi-
trator.
(9) Application of the Statute of Limitations to claims in Arbi-
tration where award is made a condition precedent to the accrual of a
cause of action; and power to review time clause in a contract barring
claims unless arbitration is commenced within a specified period.
The particulars in which the Act of 1889 has proved unsatisfactory give
some idea of the details in which English arbitration procedure has been
found wanting. The Act of 1934 points clearly to matters in which strict
regulation has been found necessary. But one factor most important in any
arbitration is not-and cannot-be covered by these statutes. That is the
question of the person and the personality of the Arbitrator.
6. 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 14 (934).
7. See Vitaphone Corp. v. Electrical Research Products, Inc., ig Del. Ch. 247, i66 Atl.
255, i9 Del. Ch. 354, 167 Atl. 845 (1933), sub nora. Electrical Research Products, Inc. v.
Vitaphone Corp., 171 Ati. 738 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934), (1933) 47 HARV. L. Ray. 126; (933) 33
COL. L. REv. i44o; Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration
(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 590.
8. Supra note 6.
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We first find "Arbitrator" defined in Giles Jacob's Law Dictionary
(published in 1729 and dedicated to Sir Robert Raymond, then Lord Chief
Justice of England) -
"An Arbitrator is a private extraordinary. Judge between Party
and Party, chosen by their mutual Consents, to determine Controversies
between them. And Arbitrators are so called because they have an
arbitrary Power; for if they observe the Submission and keep within
due bounds their Sentences are definitive, from which there lies no
Appeal. (i Roll. Abr. 251.)" 9
The modern development of arbitration has, however, falsified that
definition, for the decision of an Arbitrator is now open to review in nearly
every case where the decision of a Judge would be subject to appeal. The
machinery for review, however, as I shall endeavour to shew, is in many
respects cumbrous and unsatisfactory, and a party who has insufficient knowl-
edge of modern practice and procedure may easily be subjected to injustice.
By the law as it stands today an Arbitrator, curiously enough, need pos-
sess no judicial qualifications and he owes no legal responsibility (except in
case of fraud) to those who seek his services. The importance of his func-
tion belies the minimum of capability which is required.
Historically, the Arbitrator's freedom from responsibility is not justi-
fied. His precursor under Roman law, the Judex or private judge, ap-
pointed by the prxtor or magistrate under the terms of a submission or
formula, was liable ex naleficio if he gave a wrong decision. The reason
for this liability, even although it arose from ignorance, was that the
Judex could always avail himself of the services of the juris prudentes
(the equivalent of the legal assessor of to-day) or could have recourse for
guidance to the prxtor who had assigned the action to him for trial. Similar
assistance is obtainable by the present-day Arbitrator, but if he does not
avail himself of it and goes astray he is immune from the consequences of
his error. Every member of the legal profession and many of the commer-
cial community know to their sorrow how costly such consequences may be,
especially to the party in whose favour an erroneous award is given in the
first instance. If arbitrations are to continue in favour it is of pressing
importance that the first decision shall be the correct one so far as human
wisdom can secure, and that the arbitrator shall be liable for any egregious
error which he commits.
A successful conclusion to an Arbitration can be incurred only by wide
knowledge on the part of the Arbitrator. No Arbitrator can safely proceed
with an Arbitration unless familiar with the provisions of the 1889 Act (and,
in foreign arbitrations, of the 1924 and 193o Acts). Moreover, as from
Ist January, 1935, he will be required to know the extent to which the
9. JAcOB, NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1729) tit. "Arbitrator".
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1889 Act is varied by the 1934 Act, unless and until, as is probable, Parlia-
ment in due course passes a codifying Act amalgamating and reconciling the
provisions of both. He must also be familiar with case law affecting not
only Arbitration procedure but also the subject matter of the dispute, as well
as with the relevant statutes.
Nevertheless the foregoing essentials do not in practice preclude the
"lay" Arbitrator from acting in cases where legal knowledge and experience
is essential. The difficulty is overcome by the introduction of the "Legal
Assessor" who either sits with the Arbitrator or advises him afterwards
on the legal questions which arise and who usually drafts the award. Thus
the lay Arbitrator is saved from mistakes or oversights in matters of strict
law whilst still remaining the Arbiter on questions of fact or opinion. The
validity of this conventional procedure has never yet been tested. It might
be argued that an Award in such circumstances is not the Award of the Arbi-
trator chosen by the parties; or that the Arbitrator must not listen (particu-
larly in privacy) to any views upon the subject of the dispute other than those
of the parties. But there is no doubt of the practical value of the device.
It will no doubt be conceded that the procedure of appointing two
Arbitrators and an Umpire is cumbersome and archaic. The Arbitrators
appointed by each party are in practice advocates for their nominators, and
if, as they almost invariably conceive to be their duty, they fail to agree, the
parties are put to the expense of a re-hearing before the Umpire. On the
other hand, if a submission before 1934 provided for three Arbitrators their
award had to be unanimous to be binding. In a paper on Arbitration which
the writer read before the Law Society in 1926 10 he suggested that if in a
special case three Arbitrators are considered necessary, then the award of the
majority should be decisive, subject to review for any mistake appearing ol
the face of it. Effect was given to this suggestion by Section 4 of the 1934
Act which also gives legislative sanction to certain other suggestions con-
tained in the same paper.
The writer foresees that with the gradual evolution of Arbitration no
person will by law be permitted to act as Arbitrator who has not proved him-
self by examination to have some knowledge of legal principles and par-
ticularly of the rules of evidence. It seems a curious anomaly that although,
in order to protect the public against ignorant legal practitioners, no person
may practise as an advocate in the courts until he has given evidence of suffi-
cient training in the law, yet any unqualified person may be allowed to adjudi-
cate in an Arbitration with serious, costly and far-reaching consequences.
I do not propose to lay down in detail the professional requirements I should
prescribe, but suggest that no person other than a competent lawyer or an
accountant whose professional examination has included legal subjects should
IO. NoRDoIN, AiwITRATION (1926) (Solicitors' Law Stationery Society, London).
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be permitted to act as Arbitrator (otherwise than in trade or technical dis-
putes of quality or value) unless he shall first have passed a qualifying exami-
nation, to be conducted by a joint committee of the councils of the profes-
sions I have indicated. Moreover, if such qualification is insisted upon there
should be no need for the parties to incur the additional expense, to which
they almost invariably have to submit in a case before a lay Arbitrator
where legal questions are raised, of having the Arbitrator guided by a legal
assessor who in practice writes the award.
Of late years trade associations have evolved the practice of maintain-
ing individual panels of Arbitrators. On first thought it would seem that
a member of the trade having special knowledge of its practice and customs
is a suitable Arbitrator for disputes arising therein. But to this it can be
answered that such an Arbitrator may not have sufficient knowledge of the
rules of evidence or of the legal principles applicable to the dispute. Further-
more his very membership in the trade and his personal acquaintance with
one or the other of the parties may place him in an embarrassing position
and perhaps affect his independent judgment. This last objection, of course,
would not apply to the cases where the parties agree on a specified individual
as Arbitrator (which is always the preferable course), but only to those
where the president of the association makes the appointment.
Difficulties of the kind I have briefly suggested, and others of like
character, could be overcome by the appointment as Registrar of Arbitra-
tions, of the Senior Master of the Supreme Court in London and the District
Registrars in the provinces. These Registrars would compile and maintain
a panel of properly qualified Arbitrators comprising the leading commercial
practitioners willing and fitted to act in that capacity. For cases involving
technical questions such a tribunal should be composed of those possessing
special knowledge in each particular industry. Then on the application of
either party the Registrar from his panel would submit six names to both
parties and request them to agree upon one mutually acceptable who would
thereupon be the chosen Arbitrator. On any unreasonable refusal to agree
the Registrar would make his own selection.
WVhile no substantial steps in this direction have as yet been taken, it
should be noted that the London Chamber of Commerce has established an
arbitration procedure of its own, which it has committed to the charge of a
body styled the "London Court of Arbitration" (the use of the word "court"
being in this respect somewhat misleading). The Chamber recommends that
parties to commercial contracts insert the following clause:-
The construction and performance of this Contract shall be gov-
erned by the Law of England and all disputes which may arise under,
out of or in connection with or in relation to this Contract shall be
submitted to the arbitration of the London Court of Arbitration under
its Rules at the date hereof.
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This clause is open to objection, for it gives no certain guide to the par-
ties or to the Arbitrator as to how far the statutory provisions, are incor-
porated. Moreover, the allusion to the reference of disputes to the "London
Court of Arbitration" may be deceiving; some people will be misled into the
belief that their controversy is to be settled by the full court, and not, as is
actually the case, by the particular individual whom that body chooses to
nominate. My plea in this respect is for complete and statutory unification
of procedure so that "Arbitration" shall mean the same thing in every docu-
ment, namely Arbitration under the statutory provisions for the time being
in force, subject to any special agreement which the parties may make with
their eyes open and in plain terms. For example, in Scrinaglio v. Thornett,"
the contract provided: "Any dispute arising out of this Contract to be settled
by Arbitration in London in the usual way." It was decided that this does
not mean the dispute was to be settled (as one of the parties thought) by
an ordinary Arbitration under the Arbitration Act; on the contrary, the
clause was held to contemplate the usual, but not invariable way by which
disputes in that trade are settled in London.
On the question of rapidity it is clear nothing is gained if the Arbitra-
tor follows the same procedure as in an action, namely, ordering successively
points of claim, defence, reply, discovery and interrogatories. It would be
preferable that an intending plaintiff in an arbitration should, without wait-
ing for the appointment of an Arbitrator, serve by registered post upon the
proposed defendant a "demand for Arbitration" setting forth in full particu-
lars the nature of his complaint and the amount of his claim. This "demand"
should be accompanied by a list of the documents relied on, of which another
copy would be be given to the Arbitrator when appointed. The defendant
should be obliged within seven days to serve the plaintiff with his "Arbitra-
tion answer" accompanied by similar lists of any additional documents on
which he desires to rely. If the defendant raises a counterclaim the plaintiff
should deliver his "Arbitration reply" within three days, similarly accom-
panied by lists of any further documents. The issues being thus defined, the
dispute would be promptly ready for adjudication and its nature as thus
disclosed would help the parties to agree upon or the court or trade organisa-
tion to specify a suitable Arbitrator. In order to safeguard the parties
against willful suppression or falsification of documentary evidence penalties
should be provided for punishment of such malpractice.
Next, a few words as to the form in which the award should be drawn.
I consider that an Arbitrator should in every case, whether specially requested
or not, publish his award in a reasoned form.12 If that practice were made
uniform Arbitrators would have to listen to the evidence and study the
I. 131 L. T. R. (x. s.) 174 (Ct. App. 1924).
12. Cf. Fraenkel, Procedural Aspects of Arbitration (1934) 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 226.
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legal arguments with greater care than they sometimes do at present. It
would also be desirable that, in addition to giving reasons for his award and
dealing with any points of law raised by either party, the Arbitrator should
append a reference to the documents given to him for the purposes of the
Arbitration together with a note of the evidence given by the witnesses, so
that the court of review (should review be inevitable) would then have
before it all the necessary material. In cases where a sworn shorthand writer
does not record the evidence I suggest that it should be part of the duty of
the Arbitrator to take a sufficient note and to read it over to the witness in
the presence of the parties before dismissing him.
Unlike the judicial judgment, the Arbitrator's award cannot per se
be carried into execution against an unwilling party; the order of the court is
essential in dealing with a recalcitrant loser. Usually, however, this order,
though involving expense and delay, is a mere formality; the court, by its
own mandate and without rehearing, authorises issuance of execution,
attachment or like remedy to enforce the Arbitrator's award.
The inexperienced party to an Arbitration is apt to congratulate him-
self on having escaped the expense and delay of the law courts. But very
often he finds himself in a "fool's paradise". For instance, Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act, I889,13 gave the Arbitrator power, but did not compel him,
to state his award in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court.
Having done that, if he would do it, he was functus officio and thencefor-
ward only the court could deal with his award. The Section 7 case would be
set down before a single judge-usually the Commercial Judge-from whose
decision an appeal would lie without leave. Under Section i9 of the Act the
Arbitrator might and could be compelled to state, in the form of a special
case for the opinion of the court, any question of law arising in the course of
the reference. This having been done, the Arbitration would be suspended
until the Divisional Court (or a Chancery Judge if the case be referable
to the latter) had given the Arbitrator its opinion. But that opinion when
expressed was not an order, did not bind the rights of the parties and be-
stowed no right of appeal. If, however, the Arbitrator incorporated in his
award the opinion of the court given on the special case under this section,
the comical result followed that an application to set aside the award for an
error appearing on the face of it must be refused by the court of first instance
who would be bound to say that the incorporated law stated by their col-
leagues in their opinion was right. It was then, however, open to the com-
plaining party to appeal from this second decision and to ask the Court of
Appeal to set aside or remit the award.1 4 Under Section IO of the Arbitra-
13. Supra note 2.
14. British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Underground Electric
Railways Co., [1912] A. C. 673.
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tion Act the Court still has power to remit any award with a direction to the
Arbitrator to re-state it in the form of a special case in order to raise a
specified point of law.
The foregoing difficulties are remedied to some extent by Section 9
of the 1934 Act which authorises and empowers the court to compel an Arbi-
trator to state any question of law or any part of his award in the form of
d special case for the decision of the court. Moreover Section 19 of the
1889 Act is now repealed by Section 21 of the 1934 Act. But even these
provisions do not wholly eliminate the disadvantages. There have been
many recent cases where the judicial bench has commented on the extrava-
gant waste of time and money in cases where, by reason of the complex
nature of the legal questions, Arbitration has proved only a preliminary step
in the elucidation and determination of the issues. That complexity usually
arises from the lack of business care and foresight of the parties in entering
into the transaction out of which the Arbitration arises. In such cases,
unless privacy is essential and can be guaranteed by the mutual acceptance of
the Arbitrator's award as conclusive, experience shows that arbitration is not
the most effective means of settlement.
The substitution of Arbitration for the judicial bench should be based
upon good and sufficient reason. What then is the preferring motive?
Economy it can seldom be, for solution by Arbitration in a "full dress" dis-
pute is just as expensive as a law suit. Solicitors' and counsels' fees are no
less. The Arbitrator has to be paid by the parties or at least by the loser,
whereas the Judge is paid by the State. Expedition cannot always be the
motive, for, if either party so wishes, the procedure in Arbitration is just
as dilatory as in the courts. Whereas the court, once it starts the hearing,
continues de die in diem, the Arbitrator studying the engagements of him-
self, the advocates, the parties and their witnesses, is often compelled to
arrange a series of short appointments spread over a considerable period of
time. The picking up of the broken threads at each resumed hearing adds
to the length of time involved. Further extravagance in time arises where
there are two Arbitrators and an Umpire, or where either party requires
an advisory case to be stated under Section 19 of the Arbitration Act 1889
or the award in the form of a special case under Section 7.
Accordingly, if neither economy nor rapidity is to be obtained in the
"full dress" Arbitration, 15 what is the object which the parties to Arbitra-
tion have at heart? The answer is privacy. They don't want their affairs
discussed in public. Here is the constitutional pendulum swinging the other
way. Our Constitution makers used to insist that our judges could not be
trusted to do their duty unless they sat under public scrutiny; consequently
litigants were exposed to the gossip monger. To escape the latter's atten-
i5. From this category may be excluded quality disputes decided by a trade or scientific
expert upon view or examination. Supra p. 315.
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tions the parties are driven to the privacy of the Arbitration room-presided
over by the Arbitrator, whose qualifications and even whose impartiality can
never be certified.
In what cases then does British experience shew that Arbitration is
mutually advantageous? They seem to be limited to those where (I) pri-
vacy or (2) rapidity are essential or (3) where the dispute involves simply
a pure question of fact or technical opinion, such, for example, as whether
goods are merchantable or up to sample, or whether a given piece of
machinery will function. I cannot conceive any other cases where a private
Arbitrator will prove, in the long run, a more suitable tribunal than the
appropriate court of the country. It should be pointed out, however, that
privacy cannot be secured unless the parties agree that they will not ask the
Arbitrator to "state a case" or otherwise apply to the court for review, but
will treat the award as final. Furthermore, if the desire for privacy is, as I
have suggested, the primary reason for the growth of Arbitration, why
should it be withheld from the private citizen? No party likes his name per-
petuated in the law reports as having been involved in a legal dispute
which lays down a judicial principle, any more than a hospital patient likes
to undergo a surgical operation before a class of students. In the matter of
rapidity, under present procedure, if either party or the Arbitrator is dilatory
the commercial court may prove to be the more speedy tribunal. On the
question of expense, unless the Arbitrator is thoroughly familiar with his
duties and is willing to accept a reasonable fee, an Arbitration may ultimately
be less economical than a lawsuit.
The foregoing observations, based on and resulting from a long prac-
tical experience, seem perhaps to suggest that if Arbitration procedure fulfils
a function which is absent from judicial procedure, then a strong case arises
for that omission to be made good constitutionally rather than be supplied
by amateur or non-official judges.
Consequently, it will be seen that Arbitration is unnecessary in some
instances, and that the present system is inadequate in others. For those
cases which are the legitimate object of Arbitration the com-
mercial man requires a uniform but simple code of Arbitration procedure
so that in suitable cases Arbitration may take and retain its rightful place as
the substitute for, but not the competitor with the Judicial Bench.
APPENDIX
Notes on Decided Cases in the English Courts
Czarnikow v. Roth, [1922] 2 K. B. 478: A sugar contract was ex-
pressed to be subject to the Rules of the Refined Sugar Association which
requifed that members making contracts should refer any disputes to arbi-
tration under the Rules. Rule 19 provided that the parties would not apply
to the Court to require arbitrators to state in the form of a special case for
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the opinion of the court any question of law arising in the reference, but
that such question of law should be determined in the arbitration.
In a dispute between buyers and sellers on such a contract the buyers
requested the arbitrators to settle a case under Section 7 or alternatively
under Section 19 of the Act on certain questions of liability arising in the
reference. The arbitrators refused to comply and made their award which
the buyers moved to set aside on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrators.
The court held that Rule i9 was contrary to public policy and invalid
as it involved the 6uster of the statutory jurisdiction of the courts under
the Arbitration Act and that the award must be set aside.
Palmer v. Pilot, 45 T. L. R. 214 (K. B. D. 1929): In contract for
sale of wax it was provided that any dispute should be settled by arbitrators
in London in the usual way. The appointed arbitrators selected an umpire
by a document headed "The use of this form constitutes a submittion to the
Rules of the London Oil and Tallow Trades Association". The umpire
decided that the defendants' claim failed and that they were to pay the cost
of the arbitration.
The Rules of the Association provided for an appeal to an appeal
committee and the defendants claimed a right thereunder. The plaintiffs
brought an action against the defendants for the costs of the arbitration.
Evidence was adduced that in the paraffin wax trade the usual way of settling
a dispute by arbitration was to appoint arbitrators who could appoint an
umpire whose decision would be final.
It was held that the heading on the document was irrelevant and that the
umpire was really appointed in pursuance of the original agreement and not
under the Rules of the Association and that there was no appeal.
Ronaasen v. Metsanomistaiain, Div. Ct. 40 Ll. L. Rep. 267"(I913):
In a contract for the sale of timber it was provided that any dispute should
be referred to arbitration which it might be found impossible to settle within
IO days of a notification to the seller's agents specifying the items com-
plained of and the monetary amount claimed. The timber was rejected by
the buyers as not being in accordance with the contract and they refused to
appoint an arbitrator. The sellers proceeded with arbitration and an award
was made. The buyers then applied to set aside award on the ground that
the dispute was not within the submission.
Held, that the dispute as to buyer's right to reject was not covered by
the arbitration clause and the award was set aside.
H. Ford & Co. v. Compagnie Furness, [1922] 2 K. B. 797: Charter-
party provided that disputes should be referred to arbitration, claimant's
arbitrator to be appointed within the time limited, and if he was not so
appointed the claim was to be deemed waived and barred.
A loss to cargo was suffered owing to the ship's unseaworthiness.
Cargo owners claimed damages and went to arbitration, but did not appoint
an arbitrator within the time limited. An award was made in their favour,
the shipowners not appearing.
It was held that although the loss was caused by unseaworthiness and
the cargo owners were entitled to go to arbitration, they could only do so
in accordance with the terms of the contract which had not been complied
with and so the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award.
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Absalom v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society, [i33]
A. C. 592: A building contract provided that as and when work to the value
of £ r,ooo had been executed, architect's certificates should be given entitling
the contractors to payment at the rate of 9o of the value of the work until
the io% retained should amount to £2,ooo, and that any dispute which
might arise should be referred to an arbitrator. It was also provided that
if the contractors should suspend work except in case of a certificate being
withheld, the architect might give notice to the contractors to proceed with
all diligent despatch.
During the progress of the work the contractors claimed a further
substantial sum which had not been included in the architect's certificates,
but the employers claimed that the contractors had been overpaid and that
no certificate was due to theri. Thereupon the contractors stopped work.
The parties submitted to an arbitrator the disputes in regard to the issue of
certificates and th validity of the notice to the contractors to proceed. The
arbitrator decided that a sum of E793 remained due to the contractors but
that the architect had nevertheless issued certificates in accordance with the
terms of the contract and that the contractors were in default.
It was held that the arbitrator had erred in his construction of the
contract in holding that after the value of the work had reached £i,ooo it
was still necessary that £i,ooo should be due to the contractors in order to
entitle them to a certificate; that the construction of the contract had not
been expressly or specifically left to the arbitrator; and that his award should
be set aside for error in law appearing on the face of it.
Barton v. Blackburn, 15o L. T. R. 327 (Ct. App. 1933) The articles
of partnership on amalgamation of two firms provided that the shares of
profits should be reviewed and if necessary revised in 1923 and again in
1926 in such manner as might be agreed, or in case of disagreement, settled
by a special arbitrator. Such articles were to be deemed a submission to
arbitration under the Act. The partners could never agree whether there
should be a review and on dissolution provision was made for statements
and counter-statements to be exchanged, with" the further stipulation that if
the parties then failed to agree, the dispute was to be referred to the special
arbitrator under the Articles. The dispute was then referred to the special
arbitrator and the parties agreed that certain questions of Law should be
decided with the assistance of a Chancery King's Counsel, sitting as assessor,
at a preliminary hearing. It was further agreed that either party should
have the same right of appeal against any decision of the arbitrator as if
there had been no preliminary hearing. The special arbitrator was ordered
by the court to state a special case which he incorporated in his award. The
Court of Appeal by a majority held that this was a case where questions of
law became material to the dispute, and that the court could interfere if an
error in law appeared on the face of the award.
